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Abstract
The complexity of cooperative behavior is a crucial issue in multiagent-based
social simulation. In this paper, an agent-based model is proposed to study the
evolution of cooperative hunting behaviors in an artificial society. In this model,
the standard hunting game of stag is modified into a new situation with social
hierarchy and penalty. The agent society is divided into multiple layers with
supervisors and subordinates. In each layer, the society is divided into multiple
clusters. A supervisor controls all subordinates in a cluster locally. Subordi-
nates interact with rivals through reinforcement learning, and report learning
information to their corresponding supervisor. Supervisors process the reported
information through repeated affiliation-based aggregation and by information
exchange with other supervisors, then pass down the reprocessed information to
subordinates as guidance. Subordinates, in turn, update learning information
according to guidance, following the “win stay, lose shift” strategy. Experi-
ments are carried out to test the evolution of cooperation in this closed-loop
semi-supervised emergent system with different parameters. We also study the
variations and phase transitions in this game setting.
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Evolution of Cooperation.
1. Introduction
Multi-agent system is a distributed system that consists of multiple au-
tonomous, reactive, sociable, adaptive, movable, changeable, and (bounded)
rational human-like agents. It is widely recognized as an efficient tool for social
simulation and modeling, since the individuals in the society can be modeled
as agents, and a series of communication protocols, e.g., game-theoretical inter-
actions, reinforcement learning-based interactions, behavioral science-inspired
interactions can be defined to represent individual interactions. Many crucial
issues have been widely studied based on multi-agent or agent-based paradigm,
including digital evolution [1], social dynamics [2], cooperation and coordination
[3], and emergence of language [4], sex [5], and intelligence [6].
Cooperation is a widely-studied behavior among social individuals. A com-
mon form of cooperation in animal society is cooperative hunting. Many pre-
vious works showed that cooperation could increase hunters’ return through
increasing prey capture success [7, 8] than hunting alone. Understanding the
mechanisms forming cooperative hunting behaviors has been an issue of much
interests among evolutionary biologists and behavioral zoologists. Many theo-
retical or empirical biology models have been proposed on this topic [9, 10].
Since the classic human-behavioral game-theoretical experiments proposed
by Axelrod [11], the evolution of cooperation among selfish and rational agents
is a cutting-edge topic in social sciences, psychology, and behavioral sciences.
Many works in the multi-agent system community focus on facilitating the evo-
lution of cooperation and understanding the mechanisms behind the coopera-
tion, particularly cooperative hunting among selfish agents. Some approaches
are constructed on a co-evolutionary framework to study adaption [12]. Some
works designed different mechanisms to facilitate the emergence of cooperative
hunting, such as learning-based approaches [13], evolutionary algorithmic ap-
proaches [14, 15], neural network-based approaches [16], and behavioral rules,
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e.g., imitation [17], penalty [18, 19], and opinion diffusion [20]. Some works
which lie in the intersections of multi-agent systems and multi-robot systems
focus on constructing and evaluating theoretical analysis on robot team settings
[21, 22].
These works both from empirical biology research and simulation analysis
provide insightful basics for us. In this paper, based on an evolutionary game
theoretical framework, we extend it with multi-agent reinforcement learning to
investigate the mechanisms behind the cooperative hunting phenomena in so-
cial animals. Besides that, inspired by the division of labor in many natural or
artificial societies [23], we introduce social hierarchy to make the model more re-
alistic, combine up-level semi-supervision with bottom-level individual learning
[24], and synthetically investigate multiple related factors, such as division of
reward, penalty, and social learning. Our work aims to test the influence factors
of cooperative hunting in complex society or nature, and introduce them to de-
sign a more insightful model, rather than the most straightforward mechanism
or a stronger emergence. This model provides perspectives on understanding
mechanisms behind cooperative hunting behaviors, and gives insights into de-
centralized control of large-scale heterogeneous distributed systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: game-theoretical interaction
is described in Section 2. In Section 3, the entire algorithmic framework is
described in detail. In Section 4, we give experimental results and analysis. In
Section 5, we give a comprehensive literature review. In Section 6, we conclude
this paper and point out future directions.
2. Modified Game Theoretical Interaction
In this section, a modified hunting-game based interactions with dominant
social rank and penalty will be described. We first introduce the standard stag
hunting game, then bring in social rank and penalty.
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stag hare
stag a,a c,b
hare b,c d,d
Table 1: Payoff matrix of standard stag-hunting game.
2.1. Standard Stag Hunting Game
In standard game theory, the stag hunting game is used to model conflict
and cooperation in human societies. The classic stag hunting game describes
a situation where multiple hunters go for hunting multiple preys. Hunters can
use different strategies, but they do not know which behavior other hunters
adopt. They can only guess their rival’s strategy and respond accordingly. The
main rational goal of each individual is to maximize the cumulative payoff to
themselves.
Here we simplify this situation to a game of two hunters and two kinds of
prey. A hunter can individually hunt a small prey (e.g., hare), and receive a
corresponding payoff d. Or, hunters can cooperate to hunt a big prey (e.g., stag)
and receive a larger payoff a, since a stag is worth more than a hare and more
difficult to hunt. If one hunter chooses to cooperate for hunting a stag, while the
other chooses to defect by hunting a hare, rewards are different: The hunter who
chooses a stag will receive a sucker’s payoff c, while the hunter who chooses a
hare will receive a temptation payoff to defect b. The payoff matrix of the classic
stag-hunting game can be formalized as in Table 1, satisfying a > b ≥ d > c > 0
[25].
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the evolution of coop-
erative hunting behavior in animal societies. We modify this game-theoretical
interaction and make it more realistic to model animal societies. To that end,
we introduce some new parameters as variables, including social rank, unequal
food sharing, and penalty.
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2.2. Social Rank
The dominant social hierarchical structure (multi-layered dominance hierar-
chy or linear dominance hierarchy) can be found in many social animals, such
as African elephants Loxodonta Africana [26], wolves, spotted hyaena [27], ba-
boons, and birds especially chicken [28]. A widely studied example is the African
elephant society. An experimental illustration of social hierarchy in African
elephant society is shown in Fig.1. There are multiple regularly associating
mother-calf units sharping the hierarchical dominance structure in Loxodonta
Africana society. In such a structure, the mother-calf units can be regarded as
the first tier merging into the next tiers, which are called “familial” units. The
second tier gathering familial units coalesces into “bond groups”. Bond groups
can be viewed as extensions of familial units. Multiple bond groups then coa-
lesce into the fourth tier, “episocial units” or “clan units” [26, 29]. In this paper,
we borrow this structure to build our artificial agent-based animal society.
Figure 1: The multi-layered dominance hierarchy in nature [29][26].
Consider a multi-layered social animal structure in which a supervisor man-
ages multiple subordinates. The subordinates, in turn, manage lower-level sub-
ordinates, and so on. Here, “managing” has many meanings in both social
animals and human beings, such as 1), accessing a higher fraction of food (such
as prey); 2), collecting information from their subordinates; 3), synthesizing
rational responses according to reported information; and 4), giving guidance
to educate subordinates adaptively. These four aspects can be viewed as the
5
duties of supervisors. From a multi-agent perspective, the social animal in such
a structure is modeled as “agent” nodes, and the interaction between social ani-
mals are modeled as the edges connecting these nodes. A series of same-layered
communication protocols and cross-layered guidance rules are also defined to
represent interactions.
The formalized social structure is a multi-layered networked structure with
dominance between higher and lower layers. This networked structure is divided
into multiple small groups Gx, x ∈ (1, ..., X), where X indicates the number of
small groups in the society, and x indicates the supervisor of a particular group.
Supervisors of lower-level subordinates can also be subordinates of higher-level
supervisors. Finally, we can build a multi-layered complex interconnected net-
work structure recursively. The terminal condition is that the highest-level agent
group is small but powerful enough to make a decision accurately and quickly
without guidance. It can be achieved by adjusting parameter settings. Notice
these agents are not global controllers. They also make decisions based on local
information reported by subordinates. According to the biological literature,
social rank is public information of the entire society. In other words, agents
know their ranks, and they can also sense the ranks of other individuals using
chemical signals (such as pheromones), visual, auditory or sound-based signals,
and tactile or touch-based signals [30].
2.3. Unequal Payoff Sharing
In nature, unequal social order based food sharing is a typical social dom-
inance phenomenon. Many behavioral biologists study how food items being
shared among social animals. Smith and Holekamp studied ecological and so-
cial determinants of fission-fusion dynamics in a group of the well-studied social
animals, spotted hyaena [27]. In general, the sharing principles of their soci-
ety can be explained simply by the fact that higher rank individuals access the
majority of the food.
After playing the hunting game with its rivals, we assume that agents receive
a payoff with an adjustment parameter ηl. l indicates the specific layered rank
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of a focal agent. Agents in higher ranks (e.g., supervisors) keep the majority
of the original payoff in Table 1. Lower ranked agents receive less payoff by
adjusting parameter ηl accordingly. According to the biological literature [27],
ηl should satisfy some function-based relationships, e.g., it should be a linear or
a non-linear function.
In this paper, we borrow a basic example of the converging geometric series
to represent food sharing. We assume that the highest-ranked supervisor has
access to 50% of the entire food, and the lth layer of agents share part of the
food with a fraction of 1/2l. When l → +∞, the sum of food in the entire
society will converge to 100%.
2.4. Penalty
Penalty is an efficient way of facilitating cooperation in human behavioral
experiments [11]. Some experimental studies have also shown that animals use
penalty mechanisms to facilitate the evolution of cooperation [31, 32]. We use
two kinds of penalty for defectors, food stealing and withdrawal.
2.4.1. Food Stealing
Biological literature suggested that one of the benefits of cooperative hunting
is increasing success of defending kleptoparasites that steal food or prey from
other animals [7, 8]. In our model, defectors hunting alone cannot protect food
by themselves because of kleptoparasites or competitive theft. Only cooperative
hunting in a group can protect food completely. We assume there is a probability
S of getting food lost when hunting alone. In this modified hunting game, we
assume defectors have only access to the part of food with a fraction of 1 − S,
since original food has been stolen at a fraction of S by kleptoparasites or
competitive theft.
2.4.2. Withdrawal
In a particular round of our model, the focal agent has a choice to do nothing
to refuse to play the hunting game with a previous defector. We introduce Pd
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Cooperation Defection N/A (with Pd)
Cooperation aηl, aηw cηl, b× (1− S) cηl, 0
Defection b× (1− S), cηw d× (1− S), d× (1− S) d× (1− S), 0
N/A (with Pd) 0, cηw 0, d× (1− S) 0, 0
Table 2: Payoff matrix of the modified stag-hunting game. One player is at layer l, the other
is at layer w.
to represent this disconnecting probability, which is another penalty mechanism
[19].
To summarize, the modified hunting game payoff matrix with social-rank
based payoff sharing and penalty mechanism is illustrated in Table 2, satisfying
a > b ≥ d > c > 0, 0 < S < 1, 0 < Pd < 1, 0 < ηl, ηw ≤ 1/2, and l = w or
l = w ± 1.
3. Overall Framework
An agent-based model is proposed in this paper to facilitate the evolution of
cooperative hunting. Back to the multi-layered artificial society, which is shown
in Fig.1. An agent i interacts with its rivals who connect with it directly, and
uses Q-learning with an exploration algorithm to choose a best-response action
ai. Then agent i receives corresponding payoff ri according to Table 2. After
action-selection, focal agent i stores action ai, cumulative payoff Ri (calculated
by the sum of corresponding payoffs of all rivals), and learning parameters in
a table, reports all of them to agent i’s supervisor x, and recognizes the ri-
vals’ actions to determine whether to withdraw. Supervisor x combines all
reported best-response actions of its subordinate agents into an overall action
ax. Supervisor x then interacts with a randomly selected rival in the same
cluster of the supervisor layer, and imitates to update ax into a
′
x according
to the performance difference between the overall actions of supervisor x and
this rival (e.g., average cumulative payoff). After aggregating the subordinates’
actions and imitation, supervisor x has a final action a
′
x which will be used as
guidance to teach its subordinate agents to act better. Two basic parameters
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of the learning process, i.e., learning rate α and exploration probability µt, will
be adjusted based on supervisor x’s steering information among subordinate
agent i and the peers within the same subordinate cluster. Finally, all agents
update their learning information using the new learning rate and exploration
rate. Details of the reinforcement learning interaction protocol, action aggre-
gation, imitation method, and semi-supervised adjusting will be described in
the next subsections. This closed-loop semi-supervised process is iterated for T
time steps. The entire picture of the overall algorithmic framework (Algorithm
1) is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The overview of multi-layered artificial social structure. The focal agent i selects
a best response action ai according to rivals’ reactions (environments), and then reports ai
and cumulative payoff Ri to its supervisor x. At the same time, agent i decides whether to
withdraw on the rivals. Supervisor x aggregates all the best response actions into an overall
action ax, exchanges information with other supervisors in the same cluster, and converges
ax into a
′
x. Then passes down a
′
x to subordinates as guidance. Subordinates in turn update
all learning information.
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Algorithm 1: The overall framework
1 Initializing all parameters;
2 for each time step t(t = 1, · · · , T ) do
3 for each agent i(i = 1, · · · , n) do
4 Interacts and chooses a best response action ai using Q-learning
with the simulated annealing exploration;
5 Holds ai to play the hunting game with all rivals, and receives
corresponding payoff ri from the rivals;
6 Calculates cumulative payoff Ri;
7 Recognizes the rivals’ actions to determine whether to withdraw;
8 Reports ai and Ri to its supervisors if applicable;
9 end
10 for each supervisor agent x(x = 1, · · · ,m) do
11 Combines all reported best response actions of subordinate agents
into ax;
12 Communicates with a random peer y within the same group, and
imitates to convert ax into a
′
x with a probability E;
13 Passes down a′x as guidance to its subordinate agents;
14 end
15 for each agent i(i = 1, · · · , n) do
16 Adjusts learning rate and exploration rate according to the
guidance from supervisors x if applicable;
17 Updates all learning information;
18 end
19 //Notice agent i(i = 1, · · · , n) means the agent population in the
entire society, agent x(x = 1, · · · ,m) represents the corresponding
supervisors;
20 //For the agents at the top level of the society, it is not applicable for
line 8 and 16;
21 end
3.1. Interaction Protocol
In this paper, Q-learning, a widely used reinforcement learning technique is
adopted as interaction protocol. Every single step in Q-learning is updated as
in Equation 1 [33].
Q(s, a) = Q(s, a) + α[r(s, a)+λmax
a′
Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)] (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a learning rate of agent i, λ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor
to trade off future and current reward, Q(s, a) and r(s, a) are the expected and
immediate reward of choosing action a in state s at time step t, respectively,
and Q(s′, a′) is the expected (discounted) reward of choosing action a′ in state
s′ at time step t+ 1.
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Getting stuck at sub-optima is one of the inherent limitations of Q-learning
[33]. To overcome this limitation and facilitate the convergence, simulated an-
nealing exploration is used to trade-off the exploitation of learned knowledge and
the exploration of unknown environments. One step of the simulated annealing
exploration is given by Equation 2.
µt = µ0/ lg(1 + t) (2)
where lg is decimal logarithmic function, µt is the real time exploration
rate, t is the tth round of simulation, and µ0 is initial exploration rate, a hyper-
parameter in our model [34].
Agent i learns through interaction with the local environment with learning
rate α. In time step t, agent i chooses the best response action with the highest
Q-value with exploitation rate 1 − µt, and randomly chooses another action
with exploration rate µt. The exploration rate decreases with time while the
exploitation rate increases, which means the focal agent i not only has a chance
to escape from a sub-optimum, but also can exploit learned “correct” knowledge
better than traditional -greedy exploration [34].
3.2. Aggregation of Reported Actions
In both human and animal societies, individuals have a preference to select
rivals. For example, humans tend to cooperate or interact with more “trustwor-
thy” individuals in previous interactions. Some social animals, such as spotted
hyenas, are observed to intend to cooperate with a particular group of individ-
uals or higher ranking individuals more frequently. This intention will increase
the payoff of hunting through increasing feeding tolerance. In our model, we
introduce repeated affiliation with more trustworthy individuals according to
previous interaction experience, when a supervisor agent x aggregates all the
reported actions into an overall action ax.
Back to Algorithm 1. At each time step t, the supervisor agent x collects
all reported actions from subordinates. Agent x has its preference which is
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represented by the decision weight wt,i regarding its subordinate agents’ actions.
Agent x measures wt,i according to the previous interaction experience with
subordinate agent i 1. If a supervisor agent considers a subordinate agent’s
action to be more trustworthy, it will assign a higher value to wt,i for this
action. The overall action is the performance-based weighted aggregation action
of reported actions. Specifically, weight wt,i is calculated by Equation 3:
wt,i = β(s− wt−1,i) + wt−1,i (3)
where β is an aggregation learning rate; the initialized decision weight w0,i =
1
|Ni| , |Ni| indicates the number of subordinate i’s neighbors. This is influenced
by the cluster structure, which will be described in the experimental section.
s = 1 indicates the previous interaction at time t − 1 was successful, s = 0
indicates that the previous interaction was a failure. The interaction is successful
if and only if agent i cooperates with the supervisor agent x in the (t − 1)th
interaction [35].
3.3. Information Exchanging
The subordinate agents report the best-response actions and cumulative pay-
off after game playing. Supervisor agent x holds an overall action ax which is
aggregated from all reported actions. Supervisor x then interacts with its ran-
domly selected peer y and updates ax based on the performance difference, i.e.,
average reported cumulative payoff Rx and Ry in their subordinate groups. In
each time step, supervisor x adopts peer y’s aggregated action with a probability
E, which is calculated by Equation 4, then imitates to update ax into a
′
x.
E =
1
1 + e−(Ry−Rx)/K
(4)
Here K is noise introduced for irrational choices [36], and we set K = 0.1
1The interaction rivals are neighbors of the focal agents, i.e., the agents directly connected
with the focal agent. A subordinate agent has a chance to interact with a supervisor directly
according to the structure.
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in this model. Imitation behavior is one of the simplest ways of social learning.
Previous literature suggested that social learning could extremely boost the
evolution of a particular behavior [20, 34, 3].
3.4. Semi-supervised Adjusting Method
Supervisor x passes down a′x to its subordinate agents i. At each time step
t, based on this guidance information from supervisor x, agent i adjusts its
behavior. Many previous algorithmic frameworks can be used to model this
semi-supervised learning with the self-adjustment process, such as MiniMax-Q
Algorithm [37], Nash Q-learning Algorithm [38], and Friend-or-Foe Q-learning
Algorithm [39]. All these previous works focused on maintaining Q-table includ-
ing entire action space, state space, etc., and using mathematical programming
based search (linear programming or quadratic programming) to find the best
strategy. However, the inherited limitation “curse of dimensionality” emerges,
i.e., if we assume action space A and state space S are discrete, a single agent
needs |S| × |A||N | space to store Q-table, where |S| and |A| indicate the num-
ber of states and actions; |N | indicates the number of agents. It is unrealistic
especially facing large scale multi-agent games with large action space. In our
model, we expect to reduce space cost into |S|× |A| (exponent is the most cost-
consuming), which means agents can maintain Q-table only through its own
action space. Besides that, agents should adjust behaviors locally according to
supervisors’ guidance to facilitate global cooperation.
We introduce a simple but insightful philosophy, i.e., win stay, lose shift [40],
to build this semi-supervised adjustment method. First, we should define two
situations, “win” and “lose” respectively. If the reported action ai of subordi-
nate i is identical with the supervisor x’s final action a′x after aggregation and
imitation, this situation is approved by the supervisor and regarded as “win”,
and “lose” otherwise. The adjustment is conducted in the process of compar-
ison of guidance information and the current situation of subordinates. Two
primary parameters, i.e., learning rate α and exploration rate µt in Q-learning
based interactions, will be adjusted as the entrance of accepting guidance. If
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“win”, the focal agent will decrease both learning rate α and exploration rate
µt to stay in the winning situation, otherwise increase these two parameters to
escape from sub-optima, i.e., “shift”. In each step, the degree of adjustment is
set to 10%.
4. Experiments and Results
In this section, we present the experiments and result analysis to illustrate
our model’s performance and variations.
4.1. Experimental Setting
We clarify all the parameters in network structure, modified payoff matrix,
and proposed algorithmic framework. For simplification reason, we test the en-
tire society with two layers, subordinate and supervisor. A grid network struc-
ture is used to generate each layer. The layer is also separated into some grid net-
worked clusters. In the modified payoff matrix, we set a = 15, b = 4, d = 3, c = 2.
The mean stolen rate for defectors is set to 10% according to biological litera-
ture [41]. Notice this rate varies in different species, population density, space,
etc. We approximately calculate average values. The disconnecting penalty Pd
is 0.1. In Q-learning algorithm, the learning rate α is set to 0.1. The initialized
SA exploration rate µ0 is set to 0.144. We do not consider extension form of
game playing which means default action space is 2. For reported information
reprocessing among supervisors, the noise k in imitation is set to 0.1. In re-
peated affiliation, the performance-based weighted aggregation learning rate β
is set to 0.8.
4.2. Results and Analysis
In this section, we test the system under different conditions and give ex-
planations of different performance of our model. We firstly study whether
cooperative hunting can emerge. A widely-adopted standard for measuring the
evolution of cooperation is to test whether 90% or more of the entire individuals
choose cooperation, since it is widely recognized that global cooperation rarely
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appears considering the local interaction clusters (i.e., diversity) distributed in
the society. We set 10000 time steps as the upper limit in a particular run.
Otherwise, global cooperation is asserted as disappearance. We mainly focus
on the average payoff, convergence speed, and convergence rate. Notice average
payoff is calculated in the entire system including supervisors and subordinates.
Convergence speed means the time steps the society needs to evolve cooperation-
dominance. Convergence rate means the fraction of cooperators in the entire
system.
4.2.1. Influence of Population Size
We fix cluster to a 4 × 4 grid network, which means 16 agents are within
a small group and have a similar supervisor. We vary the subordinate agent
population to 12 × 12 (3 × 3 supervisors, total 153 agents), 16 × 16 (4 × 4
supervisors, total 272 agents), 20× 20 (5× 5 supervisors, total 425 agents), and
32×32 grid networks (8×8 supervisors, total 1088 agents), respectively to study
the influence of population size on the evolution of cooperative hunting, which
is shown in Fig.3.
We find with a smaller population size, the higher level of cooperation can
evolve. The potential reason is that when we set cluster size stable, a smaller
population size means that the supervisor holds a broader view of a partial
system, and this factor can boost complete semi-supervision. As a result, the
evolution of cooperative hunting is facilitated.
4.2.2. Influence of Cluster Size
We fix subordinate population to a 32 × 32 grid network, vary the cluster
size to 2×2 (with 16×16 supervisors), 4×4 (with 8×8 supervisors), 8×8 (with
4× 4 supervisors), and 16× 16 (with 2× 2 supervisors), respectively, to study
the influence of cluster size on the evolution of cooperative hunting, which is
shown in Fig.4.
In general, we find with larger cluster size, the higher level of cooperation can
evolve (such as the cases of cluster size 16× 16, 8× 8, and 4× 4). The potential
15
Figure 3: Influence of population size on the evolution of cooperative hunting
reason is similar to the case of population size. Both small population size and
large cluster size will lead to a broader view of a partial system for the focal
supervisor, which facilitates the evolution of cooperative hunting. Additionally,
the smaller cluster size leads to more local groups distributed in the entire
system, and significantly increases the diversity of the system. To evolve global
cooperation, it will take more effort to step across multiple sub-optima. This
will bring a negative influence on the evolution of global cooperative hunting.
It is unusual for the case of cluster size 2×2. We find the curve of cluster size
2× 2 seems to violate the general trends. That is because of the large number
of supervisors. In our game settings, supervisors share a higher fraction of food
than subordinates, and the number of supervisors is less than subordinates. For
the case of cluster size 2× 2, there are 256 supervisors and 1024 subordinates.
The number of supervisors is significantly higher than that in other testing
cases. This will lead to an increase in average payoff (both starting point and
convergence value), and make up the negative influence caused by small cluster
size.
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Figure 4: Influence of cluster size on the evolution of cooperative hunting
4.2.3. Dynamics of Learning Rate and Exploration Rate
In our model, dynamics in both learning rate and exploration rate are in-
troduced by “win stay, loose shift” rule and simulated annealing exploration.
Based on a hierarchical grid network with 12×12 subordinates and 3×3 supervi-
sors, we study parameter dynamics in reinforcement learning-based interactions
shown in Fig.5.
As shown in Fig.5, the start of the exploration rate µt is slightly higher
than the learning rate α because of the difference between initialized value. An
initialized increasing but decreasing to almost 0 afterward can be seen in both
learning rate α and exploration rate µt. It indicates that agents initially do
not know which action they can adopt, then they interact to try (“trial and
error”), hence both α and µt increase. As the system evolves, agents realize
which action they should adopt, in turn, both α and µt decrease until almost
0. Notice the increase at the start stage is slightly significant for the case of
learning rate α. This is because of simulated annealing exploration. Simulated
annealing exploration introduces a continuous decrease in the exploration rate
17
Figure 5: Evolutionary dynamics of learning rate α and exploration rate µt
µt as the system evolves. As a result, the difference between the learning rate
α and exploration rate µt appears.
4.2.4. A Theoretical Analysis of Phase Transition
It is widely recognized that cooperative hunting increases the success rate
and efficiency of hunting large prey. However, considering the social-rank based
unequal prey sharing, few individual-benefits can be earned when low-ranking
individuals participate in cooperative hunting in this society [42, 43]. These
questions are interesting to us: Will subordinates choose to defect since they
can not gain enough under unequal sharing? If so, what is the threshold of
phase transition? In this subsection, we will give a theoretical explanation.
Following the experimental settings, we study the most straightforward sit-
uation where one layer of supervisors controls one layer of subordinates. Back
to the modified payoff matrix (Table 2), for this concrete case, the payoff matrix
for supervisors and subordinates can be specified as Table 3, Table 4, and Table
5 respectively. Notice we do not list the choice of (N/A) since we regard the
disconnecting penalty as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperative
hunting. Besides that, we do not consider mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
since it is not evolutionarily stable [44].
The variations and phase transitions in hunting game settings are shown in
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Cooperation Defection
Cooperation 0.5a, 0.5a 0.5c, 0.9b
Defection 0.9b, 0.5c 0.9d, 0.9d
Table 3: Payoff matrix for supervisors.
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation 0.25a, 0.25a 0.25c, 0.9b
Defection 0.9b, 0.25c 0.9d, 0.9d
Table 4: Payoff matrix for subordinates.
Fig.6. We consider the entire society including supervisors and subordinates.
We find different potential phenomena by adjusting the range of parameters, in-
cluding cooperation dominance, defection dominance, and co-existence. When
0.9b > 0.5a ∧ 0.9d > 0.5c (a/b < 1.8 ∧ c/d < 1.8), defection is always a ratio-
nal choice no matter what actions rivals adopt. Defection dominance appears.
When 0.9b < 0.25a∧0.9d < 0.25c (a/b > 3.6∧ c/d > 3.6), cooperation is always
a rational choice no matter what actions rivals adopt. Cooperation dominance
appears. For other ranges, the co-existence of cooperation and defection can be
found in the entire system.
Additionally, there are many interesting concrete games for the case of co-
existence. When 0.9b < 0.25a∧0.9d > 0.5c (a/b > 3.6∧c/d < 1.8), the strategy
profiles (cooperation, cooperation) and (defection, defection) are both pure Nash
equilibria. Rational players can not determine which equilibrium is better since
one brings higher payoff (payoff dominant equilibrium), but the other is safer
(risk dominant equilibrium). This game-theoretical setting can be extended as a
coordination game with multiple-action space as well as multiple players. Notice
for this extension, Nash equilibrium is always listed in the diagonal from top
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation 0.5a, 0.25a 0.5c, 0.9b
Defection 0.9b, 0.25c 0.9d, 0.9d
Table 5: Payoff matrix for the interaction of supervisor and subordinate.
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Figure 6: Variations and phase transitions in hunting game settings
left to bottom right in the payoff matrix with sorted action spaces. Positive
externalities are introduced where choosing the same action creates a benefit
rather than a cost. However, experimental economics literature suggested that
coordination failure is common in stag hunting and order-statistic coordination
game without any external mechanisms introduced [45].
On the other hand, when 0.9b > 0.5a∧ 0.9d < 0.25c (a/b < 1.8∧ c/d > 3.6),
the strategy profiles (cooperation, defection) and (defection, cooperation) are
both Nash equilibria, which is called anti-coordination game. A negative ex-
ternality is introduced in this game setting where agents who choose coordina-
tion will be charged by a cost rather than gaining benefits. Anti-coordination
game is a widely adopted tool to model conflict, e.g., Hawk-Dove game [46],
crowding game [47], and El Farol Bar problem [48]. There is also a hybrid
form of coordination game and anti-coordination game called “dis-coordination
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game” (e.g., matching pennies game [49]). In this game setting, the intensive
for one participant is obeying coordination while the other one wants to vio-
late it. Discoordination games have no pure Nash equilibria following the same
mathematical reasoning in our settings. Notice considering the basic settings
a > b and d > c in Table 1 and 2, though we give a general analysis from game
theory perspectives, global cooperation without any external incentives, or anti-
coordination will not appear in the experiments. We can only find co-existence
which reflects our parameter settings, and defection-dominance. The primary
goal of this work is to design mechanisms to facilitate cooperation in the case
of co-existence.
5. Related Work
The research on the evolution of cooperative behaviors, particularly coopera-
tive hunting, can be traced to some early works in complexity sciences. Axelrod
pioneered several interdisciplinary works on the evolution of cooperation both
from theoretical simulation (notably agent-based models) and behavioral exper-
iments [11, 50]. Skyrms [25] studied the evolution of social structure and social
dynamics through stag hunting paradigms. This topic is also crucial in both
evolutionary computation and multi-agent system research community. Many
novel mechanisms can be found in previous literature to further extend Ax-
elrod’s seminal work. Haynes et al. [14, 15, 17] did a series of early works
to facilitate cooperation and coordination formation in hunting game settings
through genetic programming. Spector et al. [51] combined multi-agent systems
with genetic programming to study the evolution of cooperation and coordina-
tion in wolf-pack games. Olson et al. [12] used an agent-based model to study
the co-adaptation and co-evolution of prey and predators in density-dependent
predation behaviors. Rajagopalan et al. [16] paid more attention on influencing
factors. They evaluated the influence of three factors, reward structure, coor-
dination mechanism, and net return on the evolution of cooperation in hyena
hunting situations through neuro-evolution. They additionally studied task de-
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composition [52] in extended predator-prey models [53]. More recently, Leibo et
al. [13] applied a powerful deep network, i.e., Deep Q Network (DQN), to study
behavior adaptation as a function of environmental factors including resource
abundance in wolf-pack hunting game. Several behavior-inspired mechanisms
have also been examined, e.g., imitation [17], penalty [18, 19], and opinion
diffusion [20]. Bao et al. [34] synthetically compared different mechanisms
including learning, behavioral imitation, evolutionary selection, group voting,
and their effects in multi-agent social simulation. Some biological literature
also provided insights of evolutionary explanation behind cooperative hunting
phenomena [54, 55, 56]. All the precious works are carried out in a concrete
setting. Different mechanisms are introduced through emergent approaches. In
our model, based on a general setting that can be extended into different vari-
ables, we combined top-down semi-supervision and bottom-up emergent learn-
ing, which differs from existing models.
6. Conclusions
The evolution of cooperation is a crucial topic in multi-agent system and
agent-based model research community. Previous works showed that individual
learning-based interaction does facilitate the evolution of cooperation. However,
this purely interactive emergent approach is inefficient, especially for large scale
complex systems and widely-recognized local patterns. Centralized control is
an efficient and accurate way while with expensive costs, much inaccessible
information, and delayed communication. In this paper, we proposed a semi-
supervised approach which combines both top-down steering and bottom-up
emergent approaches. The experimental results show that this is an efficient
and robust mechanism even when the temptation to defect (i.e., unequal payoff
sharing for subordinates) is introduced. We synthetically study multiple related
mechanisms, such as penalty and social learning. We additionally investigate
the variables and phase transitions including cooperation dominance, defection
dominance, and co-existence in this evolutionary game setting. This finding can
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be extended to study many social science issues, such as the origins of inequality,
social hierarchy, rebellion, and tyranny.
Many extensions can be done based on this general framework. For example,
more layers can be introduced to build a more complex semi-supervised learning
structure. Many network structures, e.g., small world and scale-free networks,
can be introduced to represent agent-based artificial society. Some interesting
factors, such as kin selection, can be investigated based on this framework. We
made parameter approximations and simplifications in the assumptions. All of
them also need to be examined to make the model more realistic. Plus, we give
a theoretical analysis of the different values of the reward. However, the multi-
layered sharing method and stolen rate for defectors will also have significant
influences. They are regarded as in-built biologically-related parameters. The
theoretical analysis of the two remaining parameters and the empirical work of
this theoretical study should be completed with behavioral zoology researchers
in the future.
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